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Abstract

The emerging infectious disease (EID) crisis has been challenging global health security for decades,
dealing substantial damage to all socioeconomic landscapes. Control measures have failed to prevent
or even mitigate damages from an accelerating wave of EIDs, leading to the emergence and devastation
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the wake of the pandemic, we must critically review our public
health policies and approaches. Current health security measures are based on the evolutionary
theorem of host-parasite coevolution, which falsely deems EIDs as rare and unpredictable. The DAMA
protocol (Document, Assess, Monitor, Act) is nested in a novel evolutionary framework that describes
how emergence can be prevented before the onset of an outbreak. In this paper, we discuss the
importance of establishing efficient communication channels between various stakeholders affected
by EIDs. We describe implementation strategies for preventive interventions on global, regional, and
local scales and provide guidelines for using such strategies in the relevant policy environments of
human, livestock, and crop diseases.
Keywords: infectious disease, emerging infectious disease (EID) prevention, DAMA protocol, policy
implementation, Living Labs, citizen science
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The Crisis of Emerging Infectious Diseases
The past decades have seen a striking rise in the number
of emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) across the globe, including known diseases appearing in previously unknown
areas (e.g., West Nile virus, diphtheria, measles), new variants becoming resistant to treatment (e.g., malaria, MRSA),
and completely novel pathogens infecting novel hosts
(e.g., SARS, African swine fever, phytoplasma). With the
ever increasing rate of globalization, international trade,
and travel, EIDs have spread faster than ever before in human history, resulting in a staggering US$1 trillion per year
for containment costs and production losses before 2020
(Brooks et al., 2019). This figure was further elevated by the
recent COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in one of the
largest economic recessions since the mid-1900s (Blake,
2020; COVID-19 to Plunge, 2020) Another significant reason for concern is that the damages to both economic production and human life were highest in the United States
and United Kingdom, whose health-care systems were announced to have been best prepared for such an event
(Cameron et al., 2019; Singh et al., 2020). These controversial patterns highlight the dissonance between how we try
to control EIDs and what we should be focusing on instead.
As is the case with most epidemics, important conclusions are drawn after the fact that should lead to better
preparedness for the next such event. However, our investments into disease control and surveillance methods have
not been able to slow down, let alone stop, the acceleration
of the EID crisis thus far, nor prevent the COVID-19 pandemic. To understand why our efforts have not been efficient, we must understand the requirements and limitations
of current disease management strategies and identify the
gaps that allow new diseases to emerge.

(Wrong) lessons learned

The main way we approach an outbreak today is to
gather the maximum amount of data available to suggest
pathways of containment. Although effects of an epidemic
are felt throughout all sectors from tourism to education
all the way to the job market, proactive initiatives are typically assigned to only two key fields: research and public health (DeSalvo et al., 2021; WHO, 2020b). Consistent
throughout the majority of the reports and studies is the
general aim of increasing preparedness measures (Quaglio
et al., 2016; WHO, 2020b), which translates into two major
suggested outputs:
Rapid response: The main direction for developments in
public health is improving preparedness. Better preparedness involves decreasing the time required to identify and
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respond to an emerging disease. Identification of a public
health event of international concern (PHEIC) requires investment into outbreak surveillance, health-care data management, reaction protocols, and real-time communication
channels between local health authorities and regional or
global organizations (Lakoff, 2017; WHO, 2020b). Response,
on the other hand, warrants sufficient capacity in healthcare infrastructure to treat incoming waves of patients and
therefore relies on stockpiling equipment and medication,
and increasing the number of trained health-care professionals (Cheng et al., 2013; DeSalvo et al., 2021).
Focused research: The main direction for developments in
science is increasing our knowledge of the emerging disease. A typical reaction to an epidemiological emergency is
the reallocation of research funds toward studies that target the emergent pathogen, which shifts the focus of new
and existing labs. Unfortunately, analyses show that this
heightened attention and support wanes with a decreasing sense of emergency and proves to be inefficient in the
long term; thus, fund reallocation is often referred to as
“boom-and-bust funding” (Funding boom or bust?, 2009;
Kading et al., 2020).
Both outputs have had significant results in managing
reemergence of known diseases and epidemics that are
considered regular occurrences in particular regions, but
neither has yielded any considerable advantages against
the EID crisis (Lakoff, 2017; Morens and Fauci, 2020). The
reason is that all of the initiatives listed above require prior
knowledge of the emergent pathogen. Public health needs
to “know what they’re looking for” to detect it and alert
health systems at an early stage of the outbreak. Otherwise
the only clue of a recent emergence is the sudden spike of
patients producing similar symptoms with unknown etiology, as has been the case for SARS-CoV-2 (WHO, 2020a),
the 2015 Zika epidemic (Schuler-Faccini et al., 2016), and
even the currently ongoing outbreaks of hepatitis among
children (WHO, 2022a). Response also requires data on
the clinical manifestations, morbidity, and mortality to adequately prepare health-care infrastructures, and focusing
research requires an already identified and defined target
pathogen or disease. In the case of a newly emerging disease, none of this descriptive information is available, so
crisis response is therefore constantly lagging behind the
spread of the epidemic. Taking into consideration the effects of globalized travel and trade (Findlater and Bogoch,
2018; Morens and Fauci, 2020), preparatory efforts will have
little success in halting an epidemic in fulfilling its pandemic potentials, and crisis response is, by definition, a reactive measure.
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To successfully address the emergence of novel diseases,
a new paradigm has to be introduced into global health
security, shifting our main focus from preparedness to prevention, and moving our intervention further back on the
infection timeline. However, in order to change our approach, we must understand the gaps that have thus far
allowed EIDs to ravage our societies.

What Are We Missing?
Health security measures are developed by close collaboration networks between public health and fundamental
science. With constant advancements in both technology
and research, numerous defense strategies have been improved. Nevertheless, the EID crisis represents a completely novel challenge, which requires understanding the
limitations of our current approaches, particularly about
the predictability and scope of EIDs.

Predictability

Despite the extent to which epidemics and pandemics
damage a wide range of socioeconomic landscapes, concerningly few initiatives aim to prevent the large-scale effects of EIDs (Cazzolla Gatti et al., 2021; Vianna Franco et
al., 2022). This lack comes from the prevailing evolutionary
paradigm used in public health and research regarding the
ability of pathogens to colonize new hosts, aka emerging
as a novel disease. The traditional scientific paradigm states
that strong selection is acting on parasite characteristics,
which leads to extreme specialization in a narrow range, often to a single host species. Such specialized parasites are
able to better exploit host resources but at the same time
lose their ability to infect novel host organisms; therefore,
any novel colonization must necessarily be preceded by
the right mutation appearing at the right time (Parrish and
Kawaoka, 2005). Because of the random and unpredictable
nature of such genetic changes, host-switching events are
assumed to be rare and unpredictable (Brooks et al., 2019;
Molnár et al., 2022). However, this coevolutionary theory
(CT) suffers from severe shortcomings when compared to
empirical data: (1) CT’s key assumption of parasites being
tightly coadapted to a narrow range of hosts lacks empirical support, (2) CT’s prediction regarding EIDs being
rare occurrences is sharply contradicted by the accelerating EID crisis (WHO, 2007; de Vienne et al., 2013; Nylin et
al., 2018), and (3) CT fails to connect such novel colonization events to environmental changes when there is evidence that emergences cluster around climate change perturbations (Brooks et al., 2015; Hoberg and Brooks, 2015).
This contradiction between the prevailing paradigm
and empirical observations is referred to as the “parasite
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paradox” (Agosta et al., 2010), and it has significant consequences in how public health addresses EIDs. Public
health deems emergence rare, and therefore of low global
health concern, and at the same time unpredictable, thus
judging prevention efforts to be impossible. These wrong
predictions are the main reasons public efforts aiming
to address the EID crisis have been futile, and precisely
why we need a new evolutionary paradigm to resolve this
paradox.

The Stockholm Paradigm

The Stockholm paradigm (SP) (Brooks et al., 2014, 2019;
Hoberg and Brooks, 2015) relies on two Darwinian principles that lead to fundamentally different conclusions from
the CT.
First, evolutionary outcomes are always local. Pathogens
are genetically capable of infecting a certain range of hosts,
translated as their “fundamental fitness space,” but they infect only a subset of these that are available to them in their
environment, creating their “realized fitness space.” Selection acts only on traits within the realized fitness space and
has no effect on other potential hosts in other environments. Pathogens that have a proportionally smaller realized fitness space therefore have a higher potential of colonizing a novel host, without the necessity of evolving new
capacities. This potential is referred to as “ecological fitting”
(Janzen, 1985). When viewed from a public health perspective, this means emergence is a built-in attribute of hostpathogen associations and is therefore expected to happen
frequently, especially when environmental perturbations increase species encounters, which is what we are witnessing with the EID crisis.
Second, evolution is conservative. To use particular resources, pathogens will develop specialized traits. Since
these traits are phylogenetically conservative, pathogens
will be able to utilize distantly related, naive host species
upon encounter, while the same host can serve as a resource for various pathogens (McCullough, 2014; Dicken
et al., 2021; Lytras et al., 2021). The recently emerged
SARS-COV-2 uses the angiotensin-converting enzyme 2
(ACE2) as its main receptor, which is widely shared among
phylogenetically disparate groups of mammals and is
the primary reason the pathogen had established itself
in mustelids, felids, and cervids, among other mammals
(Damas et al., 2020; Hoberg et al., 2022). Translated to a
practical view, conservative traits allow us to predict the
risk an unknown pathogen poses to human populations
without having to wait for an outbreak. Pathogenic microbes can therefore be sampled from reservoir species,
and action can be taken not only to contain emergence
but to prevent it altogether.

MANTER: Journal of Parasite Biodiversity
The SP therefore changes the theoretical foundation
upon which our global health security infrastructure is built.
The bad news is that EIDs are indeed frequent and should
only be expected to increase in occurrence with intensifying globalization and climate change. The good news is
that EIDs are predictable, and preventive action can and
should be taken to avoid the next epidemic and pandemic.

Scope

With regard to EIDs, literature and policy refer almost exclusively to human pathogens (Jones et al., 2008; Findlater
and Bogoch, 2018; Morens and Fauci, 2020). Preparatory
efforts and early action plans exclusively target human diseases, which manifests in recommended actions for rapid
response and focused research (Palagyi et al., 2019; Leach
et al., 2021). But this human focus narrows our view to a
small subset of potentially dangerous pathogens while we
ignore those that affect crops and livestock. Infectious diseases that decimate agricultural production are dealt with
by food security, agri-food sciences, and agricultural policies and are barely put in the context of EIDs. Nevertheless,
the loss of production and associated costs affect regions’
economies just as much if not more than human diseases
do. Coconut lethal yellowing disease destroyed 95% of the
coconut palms in a region of Mexico; killed millions of trees
in Nigeria, affecting the livelihood of 30,000 families; and
ruined 72% to 99% of the trees in West Africa (Gurr et al.,
2016; Datt, 2020). Wheat stem rust (Puccinia graminis f. sp.)
was considered eradicated until 1998, when a new, highly
virulent strain emerged in Uganda (Pretorius et al., 2000).
Since then, it has spread throughout eastern and southern Africa, the Middle East, and western Europe and poses
a threat to more than 80% of the world’s wheat varieties
(Saunders et al., 2019). From those affecting livestock, the
2014–15 avian influenza (AIV) epidemic led to the culling of
45 million birds in the US and export bans in 75 countries
(Newton and Kuethe, 2015), and the ongoing H5N1 avian
influenza outbreak has already led to the loss of 77 million
birds (Miller, 2022). Within a few years, African swine fever (ASF) swept through Europe and Asia, destroying 20%
of Vietnam’s swine population and resulting in a US$141
billion economic loss for China, collapsing half the world’s
pork export market in a single year (FAO, 2019). Apart from
the obvious socioeconomic effects of food shortage and
skyrocketing food prices, policy interventions aimed at relieving damages of ASF were suggested to have led to the
emergence of COVID-19 (Xia et al., 2021).
Although currently considered to be separate issues
from human well-being, food security and global health
security are threatened by the same thing: emerging infectious diseases. If we understand the dynamic that allows
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novel pathogens to explore and colonize new hosts, then
we must also understand that this applies not only to humans invading natural habitats but to our crops and livestock being placed in close proximity to natural reservoirs
(Brooks et al., 2022).
With EIDs being predictable but much more frequent
and abundant than previously thought, health security
measures have to incorporate this new paradigm and adopt
appropriate and much-called-for prevention measures (Bernstein et al., 2022). We therefore describe a comprehensive
four-step protocol based on the SP that leads all the way
to policy implementations.

The DAMA Protocol
The DAMA protocol—Document, Assess, Monitor, Act—is
a policy plan derived directly from the evolutionary framework of the SP, which aims to connect evolutionary science
with applied health security. It focuses on preventing outbreaks and facilitating communication between private and
public actors, knowledge institutions, and the communities
that are directly affected (Figure 1, redrawn and modified
from Molnár et al., 2022).
The documenting of pathogens has to be extended
from only those that are already causing diseases to those
existing in wild animal and plant populations. Taking advantage of the evolutionary context provided by the SP,
anticipatory research has to focus on potential reservoirs.
Pathogens that cause disease in humans, crops, or livestock are all present in at least one other species that
manifests no symptoms. Taxonomic inventories and virological and bacteriological studies have often revealed
these pathogen-reservoir associations, which direct research focus on a subset of species within any given area.
Pathogen transmission occurs at the interface between
such reservoirs and human settlements, agricultural areas,
and breeding facilities (Gallardo et al., 2015; Cyranoski,
2017; CDC, 2022). The primary step in establishing a preventive protocol is collecting all information into strategic
inventories that feed into archives of host and pathogen
specimens, modes of transmission, and potential vectors
(Dunnum et al., 2018; Colella et al., 2021). Finally, inventories also need to include local and traditional knowledge
on the distribution, behavior, and abundance of reservoirs,
which calls for the establishment of robust science-society collaborative programs (Marizzi et al., 2018; Brooks et
al., 2019; Földvári et al., 2022).
Inventories then allow us to assess the risk posed by
potential pathogens. A three-step process first separates
potential pathogens from those already known and those
considered to be nonpathogenic through phylogenetic
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triage; then uses phylogenetic assessment to determine
mode of transmission, reservoirs, and potential vectors;
and finally maps population genetics and rare genotypes
through population modeling.
Potential pathogens are then monitored to create a detailed distribution map of areas already confirmed as well
as those determined to be suitable. Changes in geographic
distribution, host range, mode of transmission, or disease
pathology are early signs of potential emergence on interfaces between populations of reservoirs and susceptible
hosts (Brooks et al., 2022).
Adequate monitoring sets the stage for adequate action in policy making. Highly dependent on the context,
such as legal environment, policy modifications concern
areas such as food safety, wildlife management, veterinary
medicine, public health, and education. Because of the
large number of stakeholders affected by EID outbreaks,
preventive action has to be designed by multi-actor task
forces that represent expertise from various sectors and
scales. In practice, this necessitates the collaborative work
of scientists, private and government practitioners, policy
makers, and local experts. This collaboration can be realized by employing transdisciplinary approaches. The latter can be defined as “a critical and self-reflexive research
approach that relates societal with scientific problems …
[and] produces new knowledge by integrating different
scientific and extra-scientific insights” (Jahn et al., 2012),
and they are increasingly recognized for their potential
to tackle complex real-life issues by integrating different kinds of knowledge (Haire-Joshu and McBride, 2013;
Schäpke et al., 2018).
Unlike a pandemic or large epidemic, emergence always takes place on a small, local scale, which calls for
the facilitation of bottom-up effects and the subsequent
co-accomodation of grassroots and institutional settings.
When establishing task forces to put science into action,
initiators have to consider implementation strategies on
various scales (local, regional, global) as well as policy environments (human, livestock, and crop health security).

Implementation Strategies on Different
Scales
Global

Current global frameworks are all based on managing
existing diseases and increasing palliation and preparedness for those that are newly emerging (FAO, OiE, WHO,
2006; FAO and WHO, 2020). Since they are all based on the
assumption that EIDs are rare and unpredictable, plans to
prevent outbreaks are slim to none. Nevertheless, most of
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the global frameworks in use name prevention of disease
as their main aim, which refers to containing diseases at
the level of outbreak, halting large-scale transmission and
thereby avoiding the growth of an outbreak into epidemics. Although we can understand that restricting pathogens
from spreading beyond small, local outbreaks prevents epidemics, we argue that prevention should be used in the
context of avoiding emergence in the first place. This shift
in epistemics is also strongly supported by the grave predictions regarding the speed with which smaller outbreaks
can spread in an increasingly globalized world (Khasnis and
Nettleman, 2005; Findlater and Bogoch, 2018; Feronato et
al., 2021), narrowing the time window available for containment measures.
On the one hand, global health security has to adopt
a novel evolutionary paradigm to adjust risks and predictions regarding EIDs. On the other hand, the epistemology
and definition of prevention needs to be unified across all
global guidelines to focus efforts in both containing and
preventing diseases in an evolutionary context. Therefore,
current measures have to be evaluated to determine their
applicability and limitations, and prevention has to be contextualized within global health security.
The Prevent-Prepare-Palliate (3P) framework offers a
comprehensive, systemic characterization of existing health
security initiatives and describes how prevention can be adopted into current infrastructures (Molnár et al., 2022). Implementing prevention into global health-care frameworks
will help identify gaps that allow EIDs to emerge at an accelerating rate and would provide guidelines for healthcare infrastructures to intervene at a regional level.

Regional

Managing diseases at a regional level faces the challenge of having to act in various different policy and cultural environments. Ranging from upper regional levels
such as international alliances (e.g., European Union) that
operate within large-scale legal environments (such as EU
regulations), through mid-regional levels concerning one
or a few neighboring countries, to lower regional levels involving small municipalities that manage local communities, regional scales are the most diverse in terms of expertise, jurisdiction, and policies. Nevertheless, epidemics of
national concern are dealt with on regional levels, involving
municipalities directly affected as well as national healthcare infrastructures and public health institutions (Lakoff,
2017). Therefore, implementing the DAMA protocol on a
regional scale requires carefully selected methods that facilitate intersectoral collaboration and define outcomes to
accommodate local policy environments.
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Living Labs
From the toolkits of transdisciplinary methods, Living
Labs (LLs) provide an opportunity to establish solid, wellthought-out task forces that bring together the skills and
capacities required of different actors for addressing a particular issue (Romero Herrera, 2017). Living Labs can be defined as both “an arena (i.e., geographically or institutionally bounded spaces) and . . . an approach for intentional
collaborative experimentation of researchers, citizens, companies and local governments” (Voytenko et al., 2016). It
makes them suitable for dealing with health-care issues,
as they are designed to foster intersectoral communication
and collaboration, and thus increase the feasibility of intervention plans by fitting them to local policy environments
and interests of affected stakeholders (Kim et al., 2020). If
designed and implemented well, the LL approach can also
help avoid stumbling blocks (e.g., disciplinary boundaries
and silos between science, practice, and society; low feasibility in diverse policy environments; low levels of adaptability to local cultural, societal, and environmental settings;
decreasing trust in policy and politics; etc.) by involving diverse experts on legal limitations, local settings, and market conditions, and finally foster knowledge exchange and
widen professional networks.
Containing outbreaks or epidemics requires a joint collaboration between private and public sectors as well as
science and society, and prevention is no different. Current
solutions are mostly characterized by hasty and temporary collaborations formed under the pressure of a health
emergency. LLs are potentially a very impactful approach
for dealing with EID crises. They have been proliferating
in Europe since 2006, when the European Network of Living Labs (ENoLL) was founded as a platform for best practice exchange, and have since been successfully adopted
in domains such as food bioeconomy, agriculture, environment, and urban and rural development (Mirijamdotter et
al., 2006; Voytenko et al., 2016; Menny et al., 2018). However, up to the current time LLs have hardly ever been applied to the area of EIDs. Apart from the general benefits
of the LL approach just discussed, LLs can also enable and
foster discussion between authorities, scientists, and the
public, thereby addressing the dire consequences of public distrust in science and science-based policies, such as
that revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic (Kreps and Kriner, 2020; Plohl and Musil, 2021).
With awareness of the various actors affected by infectious disease outbreaks, LL setups are able to generate solutions across disciplines, making them a “proliferating approach to working in a transdisciplinary fashion” (Schäpke
et al., 2018). Stakeholders are selected based on their expertise and involvement in the context of EIDs, making
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Figure 1. The stakeholder groups that construct Living Labs to
target EIDs. Adapted and updated from Steen and van Bueren
(2017).

them highly adaptable and specific to the issue investigated. Selection must also consider the highest-level decision makers needed for efficient intervention (municipality
governance and policy makers, national government officials, regional public health authorities, etc.). Participants
generally represent four larger sectors (Figure 1):
• Public actors – Policy- and decision-makers, legal experts, and government officials; expertise in the legal
environment and regulatory role in the long-term management of the outcome. Typical actors for disease management are public health, municipality governance, or
food safety control authorities.
• Private actors – Private institutions, organizations, and
companies affected by the emergence; insights into
practical and industrial implementability of intervention plans. Managing disease will be of interest to agricultural organizations and farmers’ associations, livestock breeders, and food production companies, travel
agencies, or pharmaceutical companies.
• Knowledge institutions – Scientific expertise on the
emerging pathogen generate predictions related to
transmission, epidemic and pandemic potential, and risk
assessment. Partners to consider in relation to EID are
university research groups, independent research institutions, and scientific organizations (e.g., Chatham House,
Milken Institute).
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• Local citizens – It is crucial to include members of the
community directly affected by potential emergence.
In addition to increasing feasibility of the intervention
plans among local conditions, involvement raises awareness of health-care threats and provides the community
with a sense of ownership over the situation. An emphasis must be placed on reaching out to local citizen science programs who have extensive experience in not
only local settings but also research processes.
LLs are fit to address the issue of feasibility and temporary collaborations through an inclusive, planned process
in which solutions are planned in a precautionary manner.
Participants representing diverse stakeholders and sectors
jointly create an intervention plan, which aims to accommodate interests of all sides and respects limitations. Given the
highly diverse legal environment on various regional levels,
LLs consist of a select group of stakeholders with expertise
relevant to the scientific, legal, geographical, economical,
and social conditions of a well-defined pathogen system.
This creates a highly flexible and adaptable tool that bases
its operating on specific guidelines but is always adapted
to the local environment.
LLs that address disease prevention on a regional level
should furthermore always be in close collaboration with
citizen science and community programs that are engaging members of the exposed, susceptible population. The
following section describes the tools necessary for dealing
with EIDs on a local scale.

Local

In case of a novel emergence, the initial absence of available information leaves an extremely narrow time window
for reactive action. Additionally, because of the cultural and
socioeconomic diversity of directly affected communities,
disease management often suffers from low feasibility and
inefficient implementation (Gebreyes et al., 2014; Benelli
and Beier, 2017; Chen et al., 2021). Similarly as described for
the regional scale, the DAMA protocol facilitates bottomup processes and the involvement of local actors in both
data gathering and generating solutions. Building working relationships with members and local experts of exposed communities creates mutual benefits by increasing
the efficiency of implementing disease control measures
and building trust and collaboration between authorities,
science, and society.
Citizen/community science
Citizen or community science (CS) initiatives are founded
to include locals as active participants in research projects
that target their direct environment. With insights provided
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by patients, farmers, students, hunters, and hikers, CS has
been invaluable in tracking insect and tick vectors (Palmer
et al., 2017; Földvári et al., 2022), avian influenza in urban
environments (Marizzi et al., 2018), and wildlife health (Lawson et al., 2015).
Similar to preparation, disease prevention also relies
heavily on completing scientific data with traditional insights and observations regarding reservoirs. CS programs
provide an opportunity for outreach and contact with communities most exposed to emergence (e.g., urban minorities, underserved communities, students, rural farmers, etc.).
Emphasis is placed on establishing communication channels and training programs between susceptible communities, public health, and scientific research, creating long-term
science-practice collaborations that will serve as a foundation for continued monitoring and early warning systems.
When mapping the distribution of a reservoir and/or vector
of a suspected pathogenic microbe, local expertise and traditional insights on reservoir behavior and distribution will
be fundamental for conducting efficient monitoring. A further benefit of such initiatives is building the science-society trust bridge, which faces a difficult test during a public
health emergency. Finally, including locals in the process, including in LLs, grants ownership over outcomes and intervention plans to those whom policies act upon.
When targeting a community, it is just as important to
make sure the members involved are relevant to the research
and policy issue at hand as it is to contact groups that are
likely to positively respond to the particular research collaboration. Local organizations not only have in-depth knowledge about their community members, they already have
the relevant network and infrastructure for reaching out and
advertising opportunities. Although each program should
consider the local setting and structure of the community,
good examples of groups to reach out to are (Figure 2):
• Community-based organizations – These organizations are founded and run by members of the community who advocate for particular issues and rights and
therefore collect proactive groups of locals that could be
approached with a CS initiative. Typical examples are environmental protection groups, neighborhood associations, or volunteering clubs.
• Educational institutions – Gathering young members
of the community who are currently or have been exposed to scientific knowledge makes educational institutions a prime target for CS programs. Often, cohorts
of volunteers remain active in a research program even
after leaving the institution. High schools, General Educational Development (GED) programs, or colleges are
only a few examples.
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Figure 2. The stakeholders that participate in community science initiatives.

When designing a CS program, we aim to establish a
long-term, mutually beneficial relationship with key members of the community. This requires initial investment into
recruiting data samplers and also running parallel with
feedback and networking activities. The long-term goal of
successful CS programs is not necessarily constant data influx but building a dynamic network of locally trained experts and researchers who will remain in touch and can be
mobilized or expanded. This permanent working relationship is further fostered by selecting reliable and committed
participants for leadership positions within the CS program.
Paraprofessional networks
Although initiatives that target health disasters have
been widely introduced, including the integrated One
Health surveillance, a common issue is barriers in the way
of societal implementation, such as lack of efficient communication, fluctuating compliance and engagement, and
territorial fragmentation (Uchtmann et al., 2015). Disease
prevention relies on long-term monitoring of both pathogen and reservoir populations; it is therefore crucial to have
a permanent program in place that engages citizens, collects data and knowledge, and feeds information back to
the community.
After establishing a CS program, opportunities must be
provided for consistently involved, engaged members to
immerse within the project and gain agency and ownership
over the issue at hand. Selecting candidates for leadership

positions creates a network of so-called paraprofessionals,
who are then able to head particular tasks, assist with training, lead recruitment, and participate in feedback. A regular income assigned to such positions also improves livelihoods as well as trust and cooperation with authorities.
Paraprofessionals have been indispensable in addressing
livestock (Ilukor et al., 2015) and human diseases (Vollmer
and Valadez, 1999), and should therefore be cornerstones
of EID prevention efforts.
The strategies listed here provide guidance for implementing prevention measures at different scales of society.
Nevertheless, efficient prevention requires the close collaboration of not only partners within a certain program
and scale but also partners across diverse scales. Information and expertise coming from grassroots science must
be used to design and implement intervention plans on
regional levels, which will feed into global frameworks collecting exemplary cases and efficient methods that can be
applied to other reservoir-pathogen systems in diverse policy environments.

Implementation Strategies in Different
Policy Environments
When reviewing various EIDs, outbreaks and epidemics are
often dealt with by different legal and economic frameworks depending not only on the scale they manifest on
but also on the newly infected host.
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Pathogens that emerge in human communities, for instance, will come under the jurisdiction of public health
and health-care institutions, a cumulativeness that has already resulted in the false interpretation that the EIDs
are exclusively human diseases (Morens et al., 2004).
Pathogens that damage livestock and crops are therefore seldom connected to those that create illness in humans, despite the anthropogenic drivers of their emergence (globalization, climate change, international travel
and shipping, human intrusion, etc.) and the socioeconomic impacts being the same in both severity and magnitude (Burns et al., 2008; Gallardo et al., 2015; Cazzolla
Gatti et al., 2021; Brooks et al., 2022). Policy silos can further be observed in livestock diseases being addressed
by food safety regulations and production management,
while crop diseases fall under the concern of agricultural
policies. Nevertheless, the drivers of disease emergence
are the same, and pathogens that colonize livestock and
crops can increase the probability of emerging human diseases (Xia et al., 2021).
The One Health initiative considers all novel diseases to
be a direct threat to human well-being and has been working to implement the One Health approach to medical, veterinary, and wildlife disease management, urging for largescale, merged databases; expanding research focus to wild
populations and reservoirs; and preparing for future emergences (Gebreyes et al., 2014; Kelly et al., 2017; Chatterjee
et al., 2021). In line with these efforts, the DAMA protocol
calls for preventive intervention against all pathogens with
a potential to emerge in human, livestock, or crop populations. At the same time, this also means that prevention
has to be planned and executed in three different policy
environments. In the following sections, we will present the
main focus points, target stakeholders, and typical stumbling blocks of establishing LLs and CS programs in different policy infrastructures.

Human Pathogens

Human diseases come under the deepest scrutiny and
attract the most attention from authorities and the public alike. Nevertheless, there is major divergence between
countries and regions in terms of health-care infrastructure, pathogen diversity, and sources of potential emergence. While temperate-zone regions are more exposed
to the introduction of air travel–related infections (Findlater and Bogoch, 2018), tropical and Mediterranean areas
have a higher potential for wildlife-originated emergences
(Wang et al., 2021). These patterns are then further complicated by climate change driving both species and human migration, providing opportunity for diseases to expand their geographic, vector, and host range.
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Chikungunya is an arboviral infection spread by the yellow fever mosquito (Aedes aegypti) and has therefore been
referred to as a “tropical fever” because its distribution area
was limited to that of its vector. However, 2010 saw the virus establish itself in the tiger mosquito (Aedes albopictus) and produce autochthonous cases in southern Europe
(Franke et al., 2019), where it has since developed self-sustaining populations (Weaver and Lecuit, 2015). Also an arbovirus moving from the Ae. aegypti to the Ae. albopictus,
the Zika virus has caused its first local cases in Europe in
2019 (Brady and Hay, 2019) and is likely to threaten more
than a billion people with its recent range expansion (Ryan
et al., 2021). Finally, with the recent outbreaks of hepatitis
of unknown etiology (WHO, 2022a) and the ongoing monkeypox outbreaks (WHO, 2022b), it is clear that preparation
for the barrage of human EIDs is unsustainable. The focus
needs to shift toward prevention by launching multi-actor task forces to handle emergence within local and regional settings.
Living Labs preventing human pathogens
Preventing EIDs that directly threaten human health will
focus on the interfaces between human communities and
identified reservoir populations from which pathogens are
expected to switch over to their new, susceptible host. Exposure will often be increased by living and working in
close contact with wildlife (e.g., rural farming and hunting
communities) and/or having limited access to health-care
services coupled with improper maintenance of hygienic
standards (e.g., urban poverty, marginalized communities)
(Brooks et al., 2019). Main focus points are to control and
minimize the chances of pathogens switching over to humans, by either
• targeting a specific host-pathogen system (e.g., Zika virus in Aedes albopictus mosquitos), in which case we
identify the stakeholders affected by this system, or
• targeting people whose circumstances (living conditions,
occupation, habits, etc.) supposedly place them at higher
exposure (e.g., having a job without a remote-work option during COVID-19), in which case we identify stakeholders connected to our target community.
From the groups outlined for LLs in general, the following actors should be considered relevant to preventing
high-risk human EIDs.
• Public actors – Government authorities who address
public health–related matters, such as health services
and public health authorities, national laboratories and
epidemiological surveillance facilities, district health
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systems, and district public health authorities and food
safety institutions.
• Private actors – Private companies and organizations
affected by potential emergence or connected to endangered communities. Relevant examples include pharmaceutical companies producing treatment or vaccines
against the potential threat, travel agencies mapping international routes of concern, or software development
and data management companies offering digital tools
for tracking and monitoring human-pathogen interfaces.
• Knowledge institutions – Scientific institutions focusing
on human pathogens, such as epidemiology research
laboratories, veterinary research groups working on reservoirs or vectors of the pathogen in question, and medical research institutions focusing on human diseases.
• Local citizens – Community members should be involved in multi-actor task forces to represent local interest and expertise. Priority should be given to those
already participating in CS programs or civic organizations, with an emphasis on engaging students and earlycareer young adults.
LLs handling human diseases will rely heavily on personal data regarding local workforce, financial status, access to health services, medical history, and connectivity. It
is therefore crucial to secure data protection and privacy.
Furthermore, resources should be dedicated to communicating the process to the local community through paraprofessionals involved in the LL to establish solid working
relationships and trust between the task force and locals.
Relying on a collaborative foundation will not only facilitate
implementation but also foster long-term engagement for
maintaining preventive monitoring and screening.
Community science programs preventing human
pathogens
The focal point of disease prevention measures is engaging and working with communities directly exposed to
the emergence of a novel pathogen. As described for LLs,
the target population for CS programs is identified either
through (i) their contact with a particular reservoir or (ii)
their circumstances making them susceptible to emergence
of potential pathogens. Main focus points are to engage
members of a community and initiate bidirectional communication channels between locals and researchers. On
the one hand, prevention research relies heavily on knowledge of local habits and lifestyle, traditions, knowledge of
reservoir behavior, and the interface between potential
pathogens and community members. On the other hand,
researchers can raise awareness of the lurking health-care
threat, establish educational and training programs, involve
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locals in the project, and solidify collaboration by assigning
leadership positions to paraprofessionals.
When planning recruitment within the community, factors to be considered include setting (e.g., rural vs. urban),
occupation (local trade unions, commonalities between
employment types, working conditions), socioeconomic
status (access to health care, level of education, household
income), and cultural background (ethnicity, language, cultural habits and traditions, religion, etc.). Recruiting and
training programs should be designed to be accessible
and comprehensible for the target population and should
clearly explain to recruits why they have been selected as
participants.
Attention should be given to providing regular and thorough feedback on the process to all members of the community. Activities should be planned to ensure bidirectional
flow of information: benefiting from community engagement should always be coupled with feedback sessions
planned around delivering preliminary results, reflecting on
the experience of involved members (both academic and
community), and discussing potential impacts. This bidirectional discussion builds the trust and engagement required
to establish long-term programs and networks, and builds
a reliable network of nonscientific, local experts. Feedback
should be constant during the actual sampling and collecting to both give back to the community and collect reflections and observations that can improve methods and
communication strategies. A public-facing website that is
accessible for all stakeholders at all times is ideal, but regular newsletters or social media posts are also popular ways
to communicate effectively.
Contrary to LLs, CS programs are widely used to target
infectious disease threats by monitoring bacterial pathogens that pollute water bodies (Agate et al., 2016), preventing Lyme disease (Seifert et al., 2016), or monitoring
viruses in urban environments (Marizzi et al., 2018). Methods and practices developed in previous programs should
be implemented into newly established initiatives that focus on prevention.

Livestock Pathogens

Diseases emerging in livestock have been just as impactful as those affecting humans directly. The past decades
have seen an increase in both frequency and magnitude,
with pandemics plaguing livestock across regions and continents (Tomley and Shirley, 2009; Bett et al., 2017). However, studies often focus on zoonoses rather than diseases
that affect livestock directly, creating a lack of available information on pathogens of domesticated species (Rajala
et al., 2021). This bias in research is fueled by preferential
funding for zoonotic diseases, which also manifests in lack
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of veterinary health-care infrastructure, low efficiency, or
high-priced medications, lapses in vaccination programs,
and knowledge discrepancies in breeders regarding diseases (Brooks-Pollock et al., 2015; Ashfaq et al., 2020). Adding to the effects of this asymmetry in knowledge and research is the management of diseases of domestic animals,
which primarily aims to eliminate infected individuals from
breeding stock, with extremely limited efforts dedicated to
treatment development (te Beest et al., 2011; Nyerere et
al., 2020). Although there have been suggestions to introduce preemptive hunting strategies to avoid livestock being contaminated from wild populations (Mysterud et al.,
2020), prevention still has a lot of ground to cover regarding livestock disease. This is further certified by the major economic effects livestock pandemics have, which add
to the costs and damages caused by human EIDs. Foot
and mouth disease of cattle resulted in up to 88% market
value losses, affecting all actors along the cattle marketing
chain in Uganda (Baluka, 2016), while leading to the culling of 3.4 million animals during the UK epidemic (Blake et
al., 2003). African swine fever has led to major economic
losses in Southeast Asia and has triggered policy modifications linked to the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 (Gallardo et
al., 2015; Xia et al., 2021). Avian influenza has led not only
to dire losses in poultry production (Burns et al., 2008) but
also to pandemic potential in humans (Watanabe et al.,
2014). Therefore, in line with the One Health approach that
calls for integrated investigation of livestock, wildlife, and
human systems (Elmberg et al., 2017; Mohamed, 2020), the
DAMA protocol calls for precautionary and preventive policies that address livestock diseases.
Living Labs preventing livestock pathogens
Livestock disease will be of concern to a different set of
stakeholders than those for human pathogens, although a
considerable overlap is to be expected. The drivers behind
any preventive or management intervention are mostly to
maintain production and the livelihoods of breeders and
production plant operators. Exposure will increase in freerange breeding stocks and those housed partly in external enclosures, while outbreaks will be more likely to occur
among high-density stocks (Meadows et al., 2018). Main
focus points are to control and minimize the chances of
pathogens switching over to livestock, by either
• targeting a specific host-pathogen system (e.g., ASF in
wild boar populations), in which case we identify the
stakeholders affected by this system, or
• targeting breeding facilities and game populations
whose circumstances (housing conditions/distribution
area, species, immediate surroundings, etc.) supposedly
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place them at higher exposure (e.g., frequent encounters with [other] wildlife, limited access to veterinary/
wildlife services, lack of knowledge regarding livestock/
wildlife diseases, etc.), in which case we identify stakeholders connected to target facilities.
From the groups outlined for LLs in general, the following actors should be considered relevant to preventing high-risk livestock EIDs.
• Public actors – Government agencies involved in food
safety, including national-level institutions (e.g., Food
Safety and Inspection Service [FSIS; US], Federal Institute of Risk Assessment [BIR; Germany], Austrian Agency
for Health and Food Safety [AGES; Austria], and fish and
wildlife departments) as well as municipal-level departments of public health, agriculture, hunting, and food
safety.
• Private actors – Private companies and enterprises
whose main activity is related to the livestock and/or
game exposed to emergence. A few examples include
farms, processing plants, hunting associations, and the
suppliers and veterinary institutions that provide vaccinations and medication. In case they are active in the
area of potential emergence, companies offering digital
tracking services that record movement, development,
and other data on individual animals will also have valuable expertise in identifying interfaces and the location
of possible intervention to reduce encounters between
livestock and reservoirs.
• Knowledge institutions – Research groups that target
the livestock and game pathogen under investigation
as well as those conducting research in livestock and
wildlife vaccination, treatment, methods to increase production, and environmental effects on stock yield. Veterinary science is also a key stakeholder contributing
to knowledge on transmission, morbidity, and mortality and to potential direction of treatment and vaccine
development.
• Local citizens – Required expertise will be found among
individual farmers and workers at breeding and processing facilities as well as hunters, who not only hold valuable insights regarding animal behavior and diseases but
are also directly exposed to any emerging pathogen because of their constant close contact with the breeding
stock and wildlife.
LLs handling livestock and game diseases must always
consider that, contrary to those dealing with human pathogens, they will have dual priorities of preventing emergence and maintaining or even increasing production. As
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the livelihoods of most stakeholders are closely connected
to yield of breeding stocks and game populations, tools
such as culling or restricting stock size, increasing hunting
bag size, or applying targeted hunting should be used with
extraordinary caution to establish the long-term feasibility
of prevention methods.
Community science programs preventing livestock
pathogens
CS programs that target livestock diseases are far less
common than those that address human pathogens because the community affected by them is much smaller and
consists almost exclusively of citizens working in livestock
breeding or processing and hunters. Whether a CS initiative is designed to target (i) a particular pathogen and the
livestock or game exposed to it or (ii) breeding stocks and
game populations whose circumstances make them susceptible to emergence of potential pathogens, the initiative
will be of interest to a narrower community of local experts.
The main focus points are to engage breeding experts
and individual hunters who work in close contact with animals and are aware of the day-to-day issues and conditions
of a breeding or processing facility or a particular hunting
area. Livestock experts will be able to identify interfaces
between the stock and wildlife accurately, while hunters
will be familiar with movement and behavioral patterns of
game and potential reservoirs as well as population sizes
and demography.
When planning recruitment strategies, a close collaboration is required with the management of the breeding facility (or facilities) for efficient study design and institutional
encouragement to participate. It is also necessary to align
interests of larger breeding enterprises and small-scale, local farmers to ensure the homogeneity of data collected.
An additional opportunity lies in designing studies for the
general audiences, targeting those that are active outdoors
and therefore have occasional encounters with wildlife. Recruiting and training programs should be designed to be
accessible and comprehensible for the target population
and should clearly explain to recruits why they have been
selected as participants.
To avoid unnecessary investment, planning must always
consider existing data collected by breeders and hunters, as
both institutions collect particular types of data continually
and permanently. This data is available either from government institutions that oversee wildlife management or private breeders who keep their own records, both subject to
restricted access. Similarly, feedback sessions and reports
have to be targeted to both citizen participants and the institutional board overseeing the stock in question, which
can alter the format of the feedback.
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CS programs have been introduced into research focusing on wildlife health surveillance (Lawson et al., 2015) as
well as monitoring invasive vector species (Földvári et al.,
2022). Studies have also used CS methods to target diseases plaguing wildlife and livestock simultaneously (Perrin, 2017) and to identify shortcomings of policies addressing foot and mouth disease (Kim, 2011).

Crop Pathogens

Crop pathogens are commonly the most neglected EIDs
because they pose no immediate health risk to humans and
therefore mostly manifest in indirect effects caused by decreased production. Crop pathogens have typically been addressed by palliative efforts that eliminate them from the cultivated plant stock (Schulthess, 1761; Ayesha et al., 2021) or
by the later application of defense priming against known
crop diseases (Conrath et al., 2015). Macroscopic pests of
crops have a longer history of defense strategies, as microscopic pathogens have been discovered to coincide with
plant diseases only in the late 19th century and named as
a cause decades later (Russell, 2006). Initial research focus
gradually shifted from epidemiology toward control and
founded commercial disease control with a wide range of
bactericide, fungicide, and virucide treatments as well as extensive gene-modification research to breed resistant crop
lineages (Russell, 2006). Although without such protection
measures, losses in crop production could increase five-fold
in Europe (Oerke et al., 2012), it has now become clear that
global demand as well as changing climate and globalized
trade have subjected crops to EIDs unmanageable by current measures. In addition to the coconut lethal yellowing
disease and wheat stem rust described earlier, tomatoes are
plagued by rapidly spreading, diverse viral diseases (Hanssen et al., 2010), grapevine downey mildew has spread from
Europe and now threatens vineyards worldwide (Fontaine
et al., 2021), and the Fusarium incarnatum-equiseti species
complex has invaded leafy vegetable crops in novel European areas (Matić et al., 2020). Although still treated as an
agricultural and production issue, plant diseases now have
more studies connecting them to the larger context of EIDs
(Vurro et al., 2010; Fones et al., 2020; Yadav et al., 2020). In
line with this, evidence shows that plant pathogens follow
similar evolutionary trajectories to those described in the
SP; for instance, phytoplasmas use common receptors distributed across several insects that serve as vectors to infect
plants (Galetto et al., 2011; Trivellone et al., 2019).
Although the overlap between plant and human pathogens is presumably negligible, the effect of emerging plant
pathogens on global food security is devastating, which
justifies their inclusion within the preventive measures of
the DAMA protocol.
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Living Labs preventing crop pathogens
Crop pathogens will be of interest to stakeholders quite
different from those described for human and livestock diseases, with smaller overlaps. However, some similarities will
exist between motivation for preventing crop and livestock
EIDs, namely the drive to maintain production and yield of
crops. Also, exposure will increase in those planted in the
vicinity of wild areas, with large-scale monocultural fields
being at elevated risk for outbreaks and epidemics. Additionally, growing similar species in close spatial or temporal
proximity may further increase the chances of transferring
pathogens from one to the other (Bakker et al., 2016). The
main focus points are to control and minimize the chances
of pathogens switching over to crop plants, by either
• targeting a specific host-pathogen system (e.g., phytoplasma in their vector insects), in which case we identify
the stakeholders affected by this system, or
• targeting areas or particular crops whose circumstances
(distribution area, species, immediate surroundings, etc.)
supposedly place them at higher exposure (e.g., large
areas bordering natural habitats, limited access to agricultural and control services, lack of knowledge regarding crop diseases, etc.), in which case we identify stakeholders connected to our target areas or species.
From the groups outlined for LLs in general, the following actors should be considered relevant to preventing high-risk crop EIDs.
• Public actors – Government ministries involved in agricultural services, including national-level institutions
(e.g., National Institute of Food and Agriculture [NIFA;
US], Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture [Germany],
Federal Ministry of Agriculture [Austria]) as well as municipal-level departments of public health, agriculture,
and food safety.
• Private actors – Private companies and enterprises
whose main activity is related to the crop and/or area
exposed to emergence. A few examples include farms,
plantations, suppliers, and agricultural institutions that
provide protection methods. In case they are active in
the area of potential emergence, companies offering
digital mapping services that record distribution, density, species composition, and other data in high resolution will also have valuable expertise in identifying interfaces and location of possible intervention.
• Knowledge institutions – Research groups involved
in agri-food sciences relating to the emergent threat,
working on control measures such as resistant lineages,
pesticides, defense-priming techniques, and ways of
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increasing production as well as those studying the
distribution and genetic mapping of the pathogen in
question.
• Local citizens – Required expertise will be found among
individual farmers and workers working with investigated crops or in relevant areas, along with the general
public visiting natural areas in the vicinity of the cultivated plants. Both will have direct insights into the manifestation and the distribution of the disease and will be
able to point out significant interfaces between crops
and wild reservoirs or hosts.
Similar to LLs handling livestock and game diseases, those
addressing crop diseases must also aim to prevent emergence and maintain or increase production at the same time.
Additionally, since current control measures hold off substantial losses in production, prevention measures must accommodate ongoing treatment protocols. Finally, different
regions will often have very different infrastructure on cultivated areas, which will have a significant influence on the
potential prevention plans and their feasibility.
Although particular plant pathogens have been addressed by multi-actor approaches that target pathogens
such as cassava viruses (About CVAP, n.d.), the LL approach
is still to be utilized to its full potential in preventing and
controlling emerging crop diseases.
Community science programs preventing crop pathogens
CS programs tend to have a more thorough representation in crop disease studies than they do in livestock diseases. This difference is mainly due to the economic drivers
of controlling crop pests as well as the larger community
of farmers and general public that is able to contribute.
Whether a CS initiative is designed to target (i) a particular pathogen and the cultivated species exposed to it or
(ii) crops whose circumstances make them susceptible to
the emergence of potential pathogens, the initiative will be
of interest to a wider audience than is the case with livestock diseases.
The main focus points are to engage farmers, cultivation experts, and individuals who live in or frequent endangered areas, all of which will possess the knowledge
on crop and reservoir species as well as specifics on the
area of cultivation. Training programs should primarily focus on developing skills to identify particular wild plant
species and recognize signs of infection, which will also
be useful in tracking invasive species in the future. Recruiting and training programs should be designed to be
accessible and comprehensible for the target population,
with an additional educational role in raising awareness
about food security issues and conscientious consumer
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behavior. Depending on the setting of the study, a longterm return can be encouraging participants to grow produce at home, thereby increasing green areas and increasing self-sustaining households.
The benefit of CS programs in crop health has been established regarding potato diseases (Lidwell-Durnin, 2020)
and identifying main threats of maize and soybean in the
Amazon region (Hampf et al., 2021). Additionally, data collected by a relatively small number of expert citizens has
been demonstrated to be highly accurate (Steinke et al.,
2017), which makes CS programs very promising for implementing the DAMA protocol.

Conclusions
The EID crisis represents one of the largest threats to modern lifestyle, endangering human health, food security, and
economic and societal systems. Isolated institutions dealing
with various manifestations of EIDs have thus far been unsuccessful in stopping the wave of newly emergent pathogens. The SP provides a comprehensive evolutionary framework, which replaces current, false characterization of EIDs
with clear predictions. The DAMA protocol provides a general step-by-step plan for constructing preventive interventions that target emergent pathogens before the onset of
an outbreak. This paper focuses on the final step of implementing evolutionary theory into preventive policies that
consider scales and policy environments.
Global, regional, and local scales require precise conceptualization and the introduction of adequate transdisciplinary
methods to gather all relevant knowledge and expertise, and
create feasible, cost-efficient intervention plans. Global integration of the DAMA protocol into existing frameworks is
crucial to provide useful guidelines to regional and national
institutions; this is described in the Prevent-Prepare-Palliate
(3P) framework. Regional scales addressing EID threats are
to introduce the widely tested approach of Living Labs, which
can be seen as multi-actor platforms delivering solutions cocreated by various stakeholders. Their application to infectious disease threats will be a unique contribution which has
significant potential of dealing with diverging interests. Finally, local scales would benefit from a wide range of community science initiatives that target affected populations
directly and the assistance of local experts on various hostpathogen systems. Although each method is most suitable
for its particular scale, it is crucial that all of them operate in
close collaboration with each other, circulating knowledge
from the grassroots toward institutions. The key to disease
prevention is ongoing monitoring that engages local experts
and citizens as well as relevant decision makers in bidirectional communication.
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Another important step toward more effectively controlling the EID crisis is elimination of the barriers that exist among human health care, wildlife health care, livestock
health care, and crop health care. The current lack of a unifying scientific understanding of health issues results in divergent policies providing only palliative and perhaps preparatory solutions, none of which is efficient or sustainable
in the face of accelerating EIDs. By understanding the common underlying evolutionary drivers, predictions can be adjusted appropriately across the board for human, livestock,
and crop diseases, and prevention can be implemented in
existing infrastructures and legal environments (Figure 3).
Our advancements in technology have brought with
them novel threats in the shape of EIDs. Climate change
and globalization have changed the evolutionary trajectory
of diseases as we know them; it is therefore inevitable to
change our approach to global health security and shift our
focus from reactive approaches to those that launch earlier
on the infection timeline toward prevention.
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